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Girard’s Anthropology of Addiction. An Exploration through 
Mimesis and Mitsein 
 
1. Introduction: Mitsein and Community 
In his essay “Peter’s Denial”, commenting on the well-known pericope from the 
Gospels, Girard exercises his specialism as he does in most of his work: hermeneutical 
reading of classical texts, to unveil the mechanisms of mimetic desire and 
scapegoating. 1 In “Peter’s Denial”, however, he does more. He correlates the mimetic 
mechanism with the desire for community. According to Girard, Peter’s denial (‘I 
don’t know the man you speak of’2) demonstrates not so much his being a brazen liar, 
but his desire for belonging to a community. For Peter was explicitly asked, according 
to the Gospels, to admit that he was with Jesus. Since his being with the community 
around Jesus had fallen apart after Jesus’s arrest, and since then any possible future for 
Peter’s being with Jesus had been destroyed, Peter was looking for another community 
to belong to, to be with. Therefore, he moves to the high priest’s palace and joins the 
people gathered around the fire. 
 
It is exactly at this point of his reading that Girard launches Heidegger’s concept of 
being-with, although he does not elaborate on it.3 I will pursue the parallel suggested 
by Girard by focusing on the most obvious similarities and differences. Subsequently, 
I will try to articulate the parallel from the point of view of addiction. In conclusion, I 
will try to understand how from Levinas’s perspective addiction to mimesis and being-
with could be cured. 
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It is not too difficult to see similarities between Heidegger’s being-with and Girard’s 
mimesis. In Heidegger, the primary and fundamental characteristic of human existence 
is being-in-the-world, which is not only the being-in-the-world of the individual 
human being (Dasein) but which is ‘equiprimordially’, as Heidegger calls it, being-
with others (Mitsein, Mitdasein).4 Like Girard, Heidegger does not depart from 
individuality – an individual I opposed to individual others – but in Heidegger human 
existence is being together from the outset. The ‘inter-dividuality’ of human existence 
precedes the individuality, as Girard would express it.  
 
Without calling it mimesis, Heidegger describes Mitsein in a mimetic way. In the 
modus of Mitsein, which is the way or kind of being we all share in the first place 
according to Heidegger, we live like ‘they’ live.5 It is the inauthentic everyday life, in 
which one acts, thinks, judges, feels, etc. like ‘they’ act, think, judge, and feel. ‘They’ 
(in German: das Man) is the first answer to the question ‘who is existing in the 
world?’, ‘who is Dasein’. The answer to the question ‘who?’ is not primarily the 
authentic autonomous I, but ‘they’. ‘They’ is anybody and everybody, including 
myself. ‘They’ refers to the average life of mediocrity and distraction, where all 
possibilities are leveled down and equalized. Heidegger emphasizes that living like 
‘they’ live is not a matter of choice, let alone of moral choice, but that it is the way of 
life that we all usually and primarily lead. Although he expressly does not intend a 
moral understanding, Heidegger characterizes this average mode of existence as 
dependence and describes the ‘they’ in terms of dictatorship, which he opposes to 
authentic existence. Being and Time shows the authentic way of life as a retreat from 
everyday ordinary life through resoluteness and conscience.6 
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Because of the dependent and dictatorial nature of everyday existence according to 
Heidegger,7 I would suggest to interpret this average mode of existence in terms of 
addiction. One is addicted to the choices, the thoughts, the preferences, the habits, in 
short the way of existence or ‘potentiality-for-being’ dictated by ‘they’. Heidegger 
does not say ‘the others’, because that would suggest that I am not included, whereas I 
am principally also part of ‘they’. Neither is he speaking of ‘each other’, which would 
presuppose the plural presence of autonomous subjects related to one another. Being-
with (Mitsein) is being addicted to the idle talk (Gerede), curiosity (Neugier) and 
ambiguity (Zweideutigkeit) of ‘they’. Being dependent on and dictated to by ‘they’ is 
being slave of ‘they’: under the complete control of ‘they’.8 
 
2. Addiction 
Girard’s mimesis can also be interpreted in terms of addiction. To clarify this, I will 
generally characterize the phenomenon of addiction first. Today, addiction is 
extensively studied, mostly from medical and biological points of view.9 Starting from 
the modern autonomous subject, who is the free and responsible centre of his/her own 
thinking, acting, suffering, giving meaning, etc., addiction can only be seen as insanity 
or disease, which is indeed common currency in medical and physiological discourses. 
The addict seems to lack both the responsibility and the freedom of the autonomous 
subject.10 A phenomenological perspective, however, can shed an interesting 
additional light on addiction, especially on some basic assumptions of current 
scientific approaches. 
 
From a phenomenological point of view, subject and object are embedded in the prior 
relationship of intentionality. Heidegger has deepened Husserl’s intentionality to 
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being-in-the-world, whereas Merleau-Ponty interprets, in line with Heidegger, the 
prior relationship between subject and object as bodily existence.11 The bodily 
intentionality in Merleau-Ponty is mutual, i.e. it implies both the subject’s involvement 
with the object and the object’s involvement with the subject. The subject experiencing 
the object and dealing with it not only gives meaning to the object, but the object also 
appeals to me with meaning. It attracts me or puts me off. Subject and object are in 
Merleau-Ponty’s view like the hungry and the food, the curious and the secret, the 
hunter and the prey, the philosopher and the truth.12 
 
Seen from a Merleau-Pontian perspective, addiction is not incomprehensible or ‘mad’, 
but only gradually differing from the normal situation. Being intentional subjects we 
are all attracted by some objects. Within the bodily existence of the addict, however, 
the attraction of some objects is so strong that s/he is completely ruled by it. The 
addicted subject’s behavior is completely determined by those objects. The slavery 
wording expresses it unmistakably. 
 
As I stated above, the Heideggerian being-with can also be interpreted in terms of 
addiction. Unlike Merleau-Ponty, however, the ‘Heideggerian addiction’ is not what 
some may have – the addicts, who only differ in degree from the normal – and some 
have not, but it is what we all have in the first place. Basically because of the 
ontological structures of ‘being-in’ (In-sein), especially being-in-the-world, and 
‘being-alongside entities within-the-world’ (Sein-bei innerweltlich Seienden) and 
‘being-with’ (Mitsein), we are principally not autonomous subjects, but absorbed in the 
world.13 Answering the question who is being-in-the-world (being-in, being-alongside 
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and being-with), Heidegger stresses that this is not the traditional subject who is centre 
of its world, but that the ‘subject’: 
 
 
as everyday being-with-one-another, stands in subjection [Botmäßigkeit] to 
others. It itself is not; its Being has been taken away by the Others. Dasein’s 
everyday possibilities of Being are for the Others to dispose of as they please.14 
 
 
But the others are no genuine others. As for me, I am not opposite or distinguished 
from others, I belong to them: 
 
 
One belongs to the Others oneself and enhances their power. ‘The Others’ 
whom one thus designates in order to cover up the fact of one’s belonging to 
them essentially oneself, are those who proximally and for the most part ‘are 
there’ in everyday Being-with-one-another. The ‘who’ is not this one, not that 
one, not oneself [man selbst], not some people [einige], and not the sum of 
them all. The ‘who’ is the neuter, the ‘they’ [das Man].15 
 
 
Although the ‘who’ of existence is always also mine [jemeinig], I am stolen away in 
the ‘they’ from the very beginning. I am lost in distantiality, averageness, and leveling 
down, as ways of being ‘they’ (ibid.: 165). 
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3. Girard 
Setting Heidegger’s idiosyncratic wording aside, his philosophy of Mitsein could be 
considered to be almost a direct translation of Girard’s theory of mimesis into the 
ontology of being. Of course, stating this is an anachronism (Girard’s work comes 
after Heidegger’s16), but for the sake of the argument one could. Also in Girard, human 
relationships and human society are dominated by a kind of slavery and addiction – or 
at least, one could say, they have a strong and undeniable aspect of slavery and 
addiction. In Girard, however, addiction is not so much conceived as working between 
subject and object alone, as it could be understood from a phenomenological Merleau-
Pontian perspective, but it rather has a triangular structure. Desire originates neither 
from an authentic subject nor from an attractive object as such, it is always mediated 
by another subject that functions as a model. One desires whatever because others 
desire the same. Girard’s emphasizing the triangular structure of desire in almost all 
his work since the 1960s is too numerous to be cited. Addiction in Girard means that 
the subject does not stand free toward the object, but that the subject is inevitably 
addicted to the object as far as and because it is mediated by a mimetic model. 
Addiction is grounded in mimesis, as it is grounded in Mitsein in Heidegger. Voilà the 
important parallel between Girard and Heidegger.  
 
There is, however, an important difference between Girard and Heidegger. Girard is 
more specific on society than Heidegger is. One could argue, on the one hand, that 
both in Heidegger and in Girard, human society is the result of Mitsein and mimesis, 
respectively. On the other hand, whereas in Heidegger Mitsein is not intrinsically 
conflicting, Girard’s mimesis is. Whereas one could live forever, addicted, in the 
world of ‘they’, acting and thinking as ‘they’ do, and so being happy as slaves, the 
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world of mimesis is conflicting in its root. While in Girard mimesis is society’s very 
foundation – people imitating each other’s desires form by that a society – mimesis 
also undermines society by the conflicts it causes. Mimetic desire creates fighting over 
principally any object, and therefore it creates a war of everybody against everybody. 
 
At this point, Girard introduces his scapegoat theory. When in a conflict a scapegoat is 
found who is accused to be the cause of the conflict, the war of all against all turns into 
a war of all against one. So mimetic conflicts lead to expelling and sacrificing a 
scapegoat, after which it is often deified, because with the sacrificing the mimetic 
violence ends, albeit temporarily. Unlike Heidegger, in Girard society rests on 
exclusion; on the distinction between those who belong to society and those who are 
excluded. In Heidegger, Mitsein is the way of living we all share originally, nobody 
excepted. 
 
All this raises an important question: could we escape from the mechanisms of 
mimesis and scapegoating, and from Mitsein, respectively? Yes and no. No, says 
Heidegger, we cannot keep clear from the way of being we all share in the first place. 
We can only resolutely and consciously strive for authenticity, by focusing on being 
(Sein) itself, instead of resting with entities (Seiendes). No, we cannot avoid mimesis, 
according to Girard, and his theory is supported by recent biological research into 
mirror neurons.17 One may say, though: ‘Yes we can’. The possibility of avoidance 
can be defended. Girard’s work is one great fight against scapegoating, consisting of – 
as I said – reading classical texts, unveiling the mostly hidden mechanisms of mimetic 
desire and scapegoating, unmasking justifications of scapegoating in a variety myths 
and ideologies. 
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4. Conclusion  
I want to conclude by quoting a beautiful example of Girard’s reading, unveiling and 
unmasking. In I See Satan Fall Like Lightning, Girard brilliantly interprets the famous 
passage from the Gospel according to St. John about an adulterous woman (John 8:3-
11).18  
 
Girard points out that, in Jesus’s formulation ‘let him who is without sin throw the first 
stone’, all the emphasis rests on the first stone. This echoes on in the deafening silence 
reverberating after these words are spoken. Because the first stone to be thrown lacks 
precedent, i.e. it has no model, it forms the last obstacle to the stoning, says Girard. 
Once the first stone has been thrown, subsequent stones will follow easily because 
they will follow mimetically. Girard says that the fact that Jesus’s words have become 
proverbial and symbolic proves that the mechanism is just as alive and virulent as it 
was 2,000 years ago. 
 
From Levinas’s point of view, one may add to this that by placing the emphasis on the 
first stone, Jesus makes each of the accusers responsible themselves. Each accuser 
holding a stone in their hand is holding the first stone. This makes each ‘the only one’, 
unique. There is, after all, but one first stone, even though each of them might have it 
in their hand. What we see happening here is the making singular, the individualizing 
process of responsibility. According to Levinas, one is chosen for responsibility by the 
other.19 Being chosen for responsibility – it may sound huge and heavy, but it can 
happen in the twinkling of an eye. All of a sudden you are called to account for your 
responsibility. And you are suddenly the only one. One (in Levinas: me) singled out 
breaks up the Mitsein of the hordes, to which we belong first and foremost according 
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to Heidegger. The hordes fall apart through the uniqueness of the responsibility. Jesus 
too withdrew himself from the Mitsein, which the Pharisees wanted to make him part 
of. By bending down and writing in the sand, before and after his words about the first 
stone, he does not look at his challengers. In this way, even though he is acting as a 
substitute for the adulterous woman, he avoids being sacrificed as a scapegoat in her 
place. After all, the intention of the whole scene was to trap Jesus, blaming either the 
woman or him. 
 
Seen from Levinas’ perspective, the story of the adulterous woman is not exceptional. 
Being chosen to responsibility happens all the time. The ‘face of the other’, as Levinas 
calls it, invites or elects me to take on my responsibility.20 The core of Levinas’s view, 
in relation to Girard, is the individualizing effect of being chosen to responsibility, 
which is my unique responsibility. Therefore, the face of the other can break through 
the massive Mitsein and the mass mimesis.  
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